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INTRODUCTION
Eighty-five-year-old James O'Hara t of Yorktown, Virginia, may
have uncovered a glitch in colonial land conveyances that could
open a proverbial Pandora's box of litigation throughout the United
States. In his pursuit of a claim of right to an abandoned street in
historic Yorktown, O'Hara and his attorney have traced the title of
many unoccupied lands of Yorktown back to 1691, the year of the
town's establishment.' Relying on the abundance of historical
documents he amassed for his suit over the abandoned road,
O'Hara developed another theory-that all of the unoccupied lands
of Yorktown rightfully belong to the individual inhabitants of the
town, not the county itself.2 O'Hara threatens to have a court of law
validate this theory in an attempt to prevent the development of
Yorktown's waterfront area.'
O'Hara's threatened suit brings to light the possibility that any
current inhabitant of an area originally established similarly to
Yorktown could bring such a suit. The potential ramifications of
such suits are far reaching and would likely entangle cities and
counties across the country in complex litigation to determine the
true ownership of lands once thought to be public.
Virginia's Colonial Assembly, the pre-Revolution incarnation of
the commonwealth's present law making body, founded Yorktown
in 1691 by passing the Act for Ports.4 The Act for Ports set aside
fifty-acre tracts of land in various port areas in southeastern
Virginia, requiring that certain trustees be named in each desig-
t On July 14, 2006, prior to the publication of this Note but after its authorship, Mr.
O'Hara passed away. Obituaries, James Malcolm O'Hara, DAILY PRESS (Newport News,
Va.), July 18, 2006, at C5. Although James O'Hara can no longer bring suit, his wife and
daughter zealously espouse similar beliefs as Mr. O'Hara and may very well pursue a suit
in his stead. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
1. See Tara Hayden, Yorktown Ownership Is at Root of Dispute, VA. GAZETTE, July 21,
2004, at 1A; Kimball Payne, Paved with Good Intentions: Divided by a Road, DAILY PRESS
(Newport News, Va.), May 19, 2005, at C1.
2. See Hayden, supra note 1.
3. Payne, supra note 1.
4. 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 53-69 (William Waller
Hening ed., reprint 1969) (1823) [hereinafter STATUTES AT LARGE].
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nated area and assigning the trustees with dividing and selling the
subject lands.5 One of these tracts became Yorktown.'
O'Hara's theory is that the Yorktown inhabitants are the
beneficiaries of this "trust," and that, when an act of the Virginia
Assembly dissolved the trust in 2003,' the ownership rights in the
public lands still held by the trustees vested in the town's inhabit-
ants and not the county.' Although O'Hara intends to prevent only
the waterfront lands of Yorktown from being developed, Yorktown
is only one of the approximately twenty towns the Act for Ports
created.9 If O'Hara's theory is validated by a court of law, he will
put all such towns at risk of similar claims. The potential repercus-
sions of validating this theory would have an impact not only on the
cities and towns of Virginia, but on any land in the United States
ever set aside in trust for public use. Because of these latent
ramifications, a court must find O'Hara's theory invalid.
This Note demonstrates that a theory such as O'Hara's must fail,
not only as dictated by history and jurisprudence, but as a matter
of public policy. Part I of this Note sets forth the origins and history
of Yorktown and the board of trustees which governed it until the
board was disbanded in 2003. Part II examines the political and
social atmosphere in which the Yorktown Trust was established
and postulates that the Colonial Assembly that formed the
Yorktown Trust did not intend to make the residents of Yorktown
the beneficiaries of the trust.10 Part III explains how land put in
trust for public use and so used for an extended period of time
reverts to the general public rather than only to the inhabitants
living adjacent to the land, despite any reversionary rights the
original grantor may have intended for the subject land. Part IV
addresses the potential consequences of giving credence to a theory
such as O'Hara's, both locally and nationally. Finally, this Note
concludes that both law and public policy demand that lands subject
to public trusts be left to the general public rather than revert to
5. Id. at 55-56.
6. Id. at 59.
7. 2003 Va. Adv. Legis. Serv. 747 (LexisNexis).
8. Hayden, supra note 1.
9. 3 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 58-60.
10. As part of their interpretation of written trusts, courts must consider such trusts in
light of the intention of the trust's settlor. See infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
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the private individuals whose property immediately surrounds the
land.
I. ORIGINS OF THE COLONIAL LAND TRUST
A. The General Assembly
On April 10, 1606, King James I granted patents to the Virginia
Company to establish two American colonies, one northern colony
and one southern colony, both of which were governed by the
Council of Virginia." The council was to govern the colonies in
accordance with the laws of England and was prohibited from
passing any ordinances that would affect "life or limb,"'2 restrictions
that were quite limiting. Within three years, however, a second
charter was granted to the Company and the first legal code ever
put into practice in English-speaking America was adopted. " It was
not until 1619, however, that Virginia's constitution began to take
its existing form.' 4 In this year, the Company, "[i]n an effort to
encourage immigration and to promote a better spirit among the
colonists," reorganized the government.'" The Company established
"The General Assembly," giving it the authority to "make, ordain,
and enact ... general laws and orders."'6 The original General
Assembly membership was to consist of the Governor of Virginia,
nineteen other members expressly named by the Company," and
"two burgesses out of every town, hundred, or other particular
plantation, to be respectively chosen by the inhabitants."'" Although
11. OLIVER PERRY CHITWOOD, JUSTICE IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 9-10 (J. M. Vincent et al.
eds., The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2001) (1905).
12. Id. at 10.
13. Id. at 12-13.
14. Id. at 17.
15. CHESTER W. BAIN, "A BODY INCORPORATE": THE EVOLUTION OF CITY-COUNTY
SEPARATION IN VIRGINIA 1-2 (1967).
16. 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 112.
17. Id. at 111.
18. Id. at 112. The term "hundred" is defined as "a part of a Shire so called; either
because at first there were an hundred Towns and Villages in each Hundred, or becuase they
did find the King 100 able Men for his Warrs." THOMAS BLOUNT, NOMO-LEXIKON: A LAW
DICTIONARY: INTERPRETING SUCH DIFFICULT AND OBSCURE WORDS AND TERMS, AS ARE FOUND
EITHER IN COMMON OR STATUTE, ANCIENT OR MODERN LAWES 112 (Law Book Exchange, Ltd.
2004) (1670).
HAUNTED BY HISTORY
the Company clearly gave the colonists a voice in the General
Assembly through these burgesses, it expressly reserved not only
the right to replace any of the nineteen members it placed on the
board "from time to time,"19 but also the right of ultimate veto
power, asserting that "no law or ordinance" made by the General
Assembly had the authority of law without ratification by the King's
Court in England.2 °
The Virginia Company's role in the colony's governance, however,
was short lived. By 1623, the Virginia Colony's operations were not
yielding the profits that the Virginia Company originally expected,
and representatives of the Company requested that the King form
a commission to investigate the shortcomings of the undertaking
and "recommend such changes in the government of Virginia" as
required to punish those responsible and guarantee the future
prosperity of the financial venture. 2' After a trial based on the
commission's findings, the King effectively revoked the Company's
charter in 1624, placing its powers in his own hands.22 He assumed
control of the colony by issuing a special commission to appoint a
new governor, Sir Francis Wyatt, and establishing a council to exert
his authority over the colony.23
Although the King's replacement of the Company's government
suggests that the General Assembly was dissolved, more likely the
King-appointed governor and council merely took the place of the
governor and council members that previously had been part of the
General Assembly, leaving in place the burgesses elected from each
town.24 The fact that the Assembly did not lapse is evidenced by the
King's acknowledgment of its competence by granting it authority
19. 1 STATUTES ATLARGE, supra note 4, at 111.
20. Id. at 112.
21. 3 HERBERT L. OSGOOD, THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 43
(1907).
22. Id. at 51-52.
23. EVARTS BOUTELL GREENE, THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES OF
NORTH AMERICA 3 (Russell & Russell 1966) (1898).
24. A correspondence from the General Assembly to the King suggests this notion, as the
writers referred to themselves as "the Governor and Councell, togeather with the Burgesses
of the severall plantations assembled in Virginia." 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at
134.
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in 1627 with respect to the tobacco trade.2" Although the manner in
which counties elected burgesses eventually changed,26 the General
Assembly kept essentially the same form, and Virginia was run by
colonial rule until the Revolution in 1776.
B. The Act for Ports
In 1655, the General Assembly first attempted to encourage the
development of hubs for trade in Virginia by passing general
legislation that required each county to establish "one or two places
and no more" through which all trade was to pass.27 The Virginia
colonists essentially ignored this legislation because the lack of
proper facilities in the designated areas made it impractical for
masters of shipping vessels to unload their merchandise in these
areas."8 After this failure, and concerned with the fact that colonists
refused to plant any other crop than tobacco (the price of which had
greatly declined), the General Assembly made another attempt to
establish a port town by mandate in 1662.29
On its face, the General Assembly's 1662 Act appears less
ambitious than earlier attempts to create port towns in that most
of its language focuses on the endeavor to build a single port town
in James City.3° To that end, the Assembly instructed the building
of thirty-two brick houses in the town,"' directing the counties to
fund the construction by levying a tax of thirty pounds of tobacco on
each inhabitant of the county." The Assembly induced the building
of storehouses alongside homes by offering to those undertaking
25. GREENE, supra note 23, at 36-37 (relying on 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at
129, 134).
26. In 1634, the colony was divided into eight "shires," later referred to as "counties," that
were established to elect the burgesses in lieu of the prior system of allowing every large
plantation, town, or hundred to elect the burgesses. 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at
223-24. This system signified the emergence of counties in colonial Virginia. BAIN, supra note
15, at 3.
27. 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 412-14; see BAIN, supra note 15, at 5.
28. BAIN, supra note 15, at 6.
29. 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 172-76.
30. Id. at 172. This town is now known as Jamestown.
31. Id. at 174.
32. Id. at 174; Edward M. Riley, The Town Acts of Colonial Virginia, 16 J. S. HIST. 306,
308 (1950).
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such construction the land on which the buildings were erected free
and in fee simple." But the Act endeavored to do more; in the Act's
last paragraph, the Assembly instructed that the thirty-pound levy
be used to build towns on the York River, the Rappahannock River,
the Potomac River, and at Accamack County, each in consecutive
years.3 4 This Act resulted only in the building of four or five houses
in Jamestown, which the British head of Parliament seemed to
believe was a success.3 5 But this Act, too, was doomed to fail from
the start, a failure which the Assembly apparently foresaw: the
wording of the preamble demonstrated the Assembly's reluctance
to adopt the enactment by drawing attention to the fact that it was
under orders to do so.36 Realizing the true need for port towns, and
seemingly undaunted, the General Assembly made yet another
attempt to mandate the creation of port towns in 1680.8'
Under the 1680 Act, sometimes referred to as the Cohabitation
Act of 1680, the Assembly mandated that each county purchase
fifty-acre tracts and put them under the control of designated
"feofees in trust ... to and for the use of the county," requiring that
the feofees sell these tracts only to those individuals that promised
to build houses or warehouses on them.3" Again, however, the strict
requirements of this Act made complying with it economically
"impracticable" for masters of shipping vessels,39 resulting in the
establishment of only two towns, which eventually became the cities
of Hampton and Norfolk.4 ° Apparently undaunted by its previous
three failures, the General Assembly passed "An act for Ports, etc."
in 1691, which contained provisions that closely paralleled those of
the 1680 Act. 4
1
The Act for Ports, like the 1680 Act, granted fifty-acre tracts to
"feofees in trust" to be divided into lots and only sold to those who
33. 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 174.
34. Id. at 176; Riley, supra note 32, at 308-09.
35. See Riley, supra note 32, at 309.
36. Id. at 308; see 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 172.
37. BAIN, supra note 15, at 6; Riley, supra note 32, at 309; see 2 STATUTES AT LARGE,
supra note 4, at 471-78.
38. 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 473-74.
39. Id. at 508.
40. BAIN, supra note 15, at 6.
41. See 3 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 53-69.
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promised to build on them.4" There was, however, one subtle
difference in the language of the two acts. Under the 1680 Act,
failing to build on purchased land resulted in the forfeiture of the
land and its "rever[sion] to the county."4 In contrast, the Act for
Ports established that failing to build on or pay taxes on purchased
land caused a "forfeiture of the said lands to the feoffees or
trustees."" The legal significance of this difference is minimal
because the result of both reversion clauses is to put the land back
in the hands of the trusts to resell to other people.45 But it is this
subtle language difference that provides the foundation for O'Hara's
theory.
The Act for Ports was as unsuccessful as the General Assembly's
prior attempts to establish towns, but it was enough to aid in the
formation of two more towns, Gloucestertown46 and Yorktown,47 on
opposite sides of the York River. The General Assembly tried once
more in 1705 to establish port towns by decree, even offering
incentives such as exempting potential lot purchasers from certain
levies on tobacco.4" This attempt also failed, marking the General
Assembly's last express effort to create towns by mandate; thereaf-
ter, the Assembly enacted legislation for the establishment of towns
only on an individual basis, as required.49
C. Yorktown
The size and shape of Yorktown has changed significantly since
it was first established in 1691. One must trace a confusing set of
land transfers to determine what land the Yorktown trustees
42. Id. at 55-56.
43. Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 56-57 (emphasis added).
45. This Note establishes that the General Assembly intended to make the individual
counties in which these towns were created the beneficiaries of the trusts, and therefore it
ultimately would not matter whether the land was to revert to the trust or directly to the
county. Even if it reverted to the trust, the county would receive the lands as the beneficiary
of that trust. See infra Part II.
46. See MARTHA W. MCCARTNEY, WITH REVERENCE FOR THE PAST I00 (2001).
47. See History of York County in the Seventeenth Century, 1 TYLER'S Q. & GENEALOGICAL
MAG. 231, 256-58 (1920) [hereinafter History of York County].
48. BAIN, supra note 15, at 7 (citing 3 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 404-19).
49. Id. at 8.
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actually held at the time of their dissolution in 2003. Unfortunately,
the area with the most scattered history of ownership is Yorktown's
waterfront area-the same area that is at the heart of O'Hara's
potential claim.
Per the Act for Ports, the General Assembly bought a fifty-acre
tract of land on the York River from Benjamin Read for 10,000
pounds of tobacco.5" A colonist named Lawrence Smith completed
and recorded the first survey of this land in the same year. Smith
divided the fifty-acre tract into eighty-five half-acre lots,"' only two
of which apparently were never purchased.52 The original survey,
however, excluded approximately five acres of land on the bluff
below the town, between the York River and the border of the
northeastern-most lots.53 Leaving such a buffer between a river and
a platted tract of land was common practice in colonial times,54 as
such land was often thought of as having no value.55
50. History of York County, supra note 47, at 258 ("The sum paid Benjamin Reade for the
fifty acres was 10,000 pounds of tobacco and cask."); see 3 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4,
at 53-69.
51. See CHARLES E. HATCH, JR.,YORKTOWNUNDERTHEHILL 3 (1972) (citing York County
Deeds, Orders, Wills No. 9, 42-43, 64, 69-70 (1691-1694)). A gully that runs through the
northeast portion of the fifty-acre tract occupied some of the seven-and-a-half acres not used
when dividing up the eighty-five half-acre lots. See York County Deeds, Orders, Wills No. 9,
70 (1691-1694) (labeling the gully in plat as "A Great Valley"). Land for streets and alleys
occupied the rest. Id.
52. See 2 PHILLIP ALEXANDER BRUCE, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF VIRGINIA IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 557 (1907) ("Only two [of the eighty-five lots] appear to have
remained without a purchaser.').
53. See id.; CLYDE F. TRUDELL, COLONIAL YORKTOWN: BEING A BRIEF HISTORIE OF THE
PLACE; TOGETHER WITH SOMETHING OF ITS HOUSES AND PUBLICK BUILDINGS 46 (1938)
(discussing the exclusion of five acres).
54. In Morris v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized this practice, stating:
When a town is situated on a navigable river, it is generally the custom to leave
an open space between the line of the lots next the [sic] river and the river
itself. This was done by William Penn in 1682 in the original plan of the city of
Philadelphia on the Delaware River front, and he called it a top common ....
174 U.S. 196, 246 (1899) (finding that property owners had no claim of right to the lands
between their lots and the Potomac River because such lands were designated for public use
and the land office did not have the authority to grant the lands as the property owners
asserted).
55. Lawrence Smith, in his original survey of Yorktown in 1691, described the bluff and
shore area of Yorktown as having "noe value." HATCH, supra note 51, at 3 (citing York
County Deeds, Orders, Wills No. 9, 42-43, 64, 69-70 (1691-1694)). As the Supreme Court of
Virginia stated in Miller v. Commonwealth, such land was thought to have very little value
compared with other lands because of the quit-rent system in place, which required a party
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Despite the belief in 1691 that the land on the bluff below
Yorktown was of little or no value, the land became quite valuable
to Yorktown inhabitants in the decades that followed as the
shipping activity in the town increased.5 6 By 1738, ongoing disputes
over the right to title in this waterfront land generated enough
concern that the General Assembly had to call a special meeting to
remedy the problem.5 7 Although all indications suggest that
Benjamin Read intended to include the bluff below the town in the
original fifty-acre grant,58 his son and heir to his estate, Gwyn
Read, contended that Benjamin only owned the land in fee tail,59
and therefore could not have conveyed more than the original fifty
acres above the bluff as specified by the Assembly. ° Although there
were flaws in this reasoning, the people of Yorktown took the claim
seriously enough to be "willing to pay ... a reasonable consideration
... for removing all doubts and controversies" with respect to the
waterfront land.61 The General Assembly accepted the town's
willingness to pay for this land and authorized the land's purchase
for one hundred pounds, vesting title in the trustees and designat-
ing that the land remain "a common, for the use of the inhabitants
to pay the King one shilling annually for every fifty acres he owned; this policy made such
inarable lands "practically worthless" for generating revenue to put toward quit-rents. 166
S.E.2d 557, 560-61 (Va. 1932). Although the strip of land in Yorktown was not marsh land
like the land discussed in Miller, it was on a steep bluff, which similarly deprived it of
economic utility.
56. See HATCH, supra note 51, at 7; TRUDELL, supra note 53, at 46.
57. See 5 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 68-71 (containing "An Act, for better
securing the title of certain Lands to the feofees of the Town of York; and for settling the
same, for a Common, for the use of the Inhabitants of the said Town').
58. For the forty years Benjamin Read lived after selling the fifty-acre tract, he never
interfered with Yorktown's inhabitants' use of the land between their lots and the water.
HATCH, supra note 51, at 7 (citing 5 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 70). Leaving such
land to public use was a regular practice at the time. See supra note 54.
59. A fee tail is a grant of property to an individual and to that individual's descendants
and is subject to a right of reversion or a remainder in the grantor if the tenant in tail dies
with no lineal descendants. See Jiggetts v. Davis, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 368, 418-20 (1829)
(defining a fee tail while finding that such estates were prohibited by a 1785 act of the
General Assembly). The term "fee tail" comes from the early modern English doctrine of
entail, which arose out of the principle of primogeniture and required the current possessor
of an estate to transmit the estate unimpaired to his heirs. See J. Bradford Delong, A History
of Bequests in the United States, in DEATH AND DOLLARS: THE ROLE OF GIrs AND BEQUESTS
IN AMERICA 33, 34 (Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sund6n eds., 2003).
60. HATCH, supra note 51, at 7.
61. 5 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 71.
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of the said town, from henceforth, for ever. 62 To raise the one
hundred pounds for the land, the General Assembly gave the
trustees the authority "to levy the said sum" against the inhabit-
ants of the town "in such proportion as they shall think proper,
having regard to the value of the lots."63 O'Hara's theory is based on
a claim that this levy and the 1691 Act's language create a right of
reverter in the waterfront lands once held by the trustees for public
use.
64
Although the "commons" area was supposed to remain designated
for public use "for ever," this land was both privately and publicly
used in the years to follow, as evidenced by the deeds of conveyance
and lease of the subject lands appearing in the York County records
during this time. 5 In fact, as author and historian Clyde Trudell so
succinctly put it, "[florever, in this case, meant until 1785 when
part of the commons was subdivided and sixty-four new lots were
added to the eighty-five of the original 1691 survey. '66 The event in
1785 to which Trudell referred was an act of the General Assembly
authorizing the trustees "to lay out, allot, and dispose of" the
commons area as they saw fit, with any unsold portions to remain
as commons.
67
Keeping with the trend established in the first century of
Yorktown's existence, Yorktown's waterfront property changed
hands many times during the two centuries following the 1785 Act.
In 1933, the trustees involved the National Park Service (NPS) in
reconstructing a town wharf that had been destroyed in a storm,68
offering to convey the land on which the wharf was located to the
United States for constructing a Colonial National Monument and
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Hayden, supra note 1 (describing O'Hara's theory).
65. HATCH, supra note 51, at 10. In 1716, the Executive Council of Virginia gave a patent
to Charles Chiswell, granting him part of the waterfront area to build a wharf and a
warehouse. 3 EXECUTIVE JOURNAL OF THE COUNCIL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA, 426, 430 (H.R.
McIlwaine ed., 1928) (1705-1721). And in 1728, the Executive Council gave patents to
Richard Ambler, Thomas Nelson, Cole Digges, and John Ballard to build warehouses and
wharfs on the waterfront. 4 id. at 183-84, 207-08 (1721-1739).
66. TRUDELL, supra note 53, at 46.
67. 12 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 218.
68. Minutes of Meeting of Yorktown Board of Trustees, in Yorktown, Va. at 1-3 (Oct. 14,
1933) (on file with Clerk of the Court, York County, Va.).
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for the benefit of the trustees and the county. 69 By an act of the
General Assembly less than one year later, the trustees rescinded
their offer of conveyance to the United States and created a new
deed by which they reserved a possibility of reverter for themselves,
conveying the land subject to the condition that it be used only "for
the use of the Colonial National Monument.""° Adding more
confusion to the transfer of ownership to the United States, in 1956
the General Assembly amended its 1934 act to allow the United
States to use the deeded portion of the land for an additional
purpose: constructing a post office." Then, by deed of September 13,
1957, the United States conveyed the remaining portion of the
waterfront parcel not being used for the post office back to the
trustees, establishing a possibility of reverter in the trustees for the
portion being used by the federal government for the post office if
that land should ever cease being used for a post office or a public
park. 2 It is on these lands that Yorktown erected a $24 million
commercial waterfront area in 2005, 7 and, despite the complicated
back-and-forth trail of title between the trustees and the United
States, O'Hara claims a vested interest in these same lands as a
resident of Yorktown and a beneficiary of the Yorktown Trust.7 4
69. Minutes of Meeting of Yorktown Board of Trustees, in Yorktown, Va. at 1, 4-5 (Oct.
28, 1933) (on file with Clerk of the Court, York County, Va.); see also 1934 Va. Acts 6;
Minutes of Meeting of Yorktown Board of Trustees, in Yorktown, Va. (Apr. 23, 1934) (on file
with Clerk of the Court, York County, Va.); Minutes of Meeting of Yorktown Board of
Trustees, in Yorktown, Va. (Feb. 6, 1934) (on file with Clerk of the Court, York County, Va.).
70. Minutes of Meeting of Yorktown Board of Trustees, in Yorktown, Va. (Aug. 20, 1934)
(on file with Clerk of the Court, York County, Va.). The subject land is bounded on the
southeast by a line running from Ballard Street to the low-water mark of the York River, on
the southwest by Water Street, on the northeast by the York River, and on the northwest by
the northwest limits of Yorktown. York County Deed Book No. 49, 188-90 (Nov. 27, 1934) (on
file with Clerk of the Court, York County, Va.); Michael L. Wood, Attorney at Law, Report
on Land Holdings of the Properties of the Yorktown Trustees (Dec. 4, 1989) (transcript at 5,
on file with York County Attorney).
71. 1956 Va. Acts 1062.
72. See York County Deed Book No. 49, 191 (Nov. 13, 1957) (on file with Clerk of the
Court, York County, Va.).
73. Hayden, supra note 1. On May 28, 2005, York County held the grand opening of
Riverwalk Landing, a commercial waterfront area containing "a variety of shops, fine dining,
a performance area, two-tier parking terrace, and two docks." Press Release, Riverwalk
Landing, Yorktown Celebrates Riverwalk Landing Grand Opening Memorial Day Weekend,
May 28-30 (May 17, 2005), available at http://www.yorkcounty.gov/riverwalklpressl
arch_2004/2005-008.htm.
74. Hayden, supra note 1.
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D. The Yorktown Trustees
Land trusts were a common means of managing lands in the
seventeenth century, and it is no surprise that the General
Assembly used these same means to establish port towns through-
out the Colony of Virginia. English Courts of Chancery first
conceptualized, adopted, and enforced trusts in the fifteenth
century.75 At that time, land holdings were the primary form of
wealth, and the channel through which the wealthy transferred
their land to subsequent generations was the lineage of the oldest
son.76 This doctrine, known as primogeniture, survived to the
1700s.77 Because mortality rates were high during this era, land
trusts were the obvious solution to protect the lands that would
otherwise transfer directly to orphaned infants and juveniles..7 The
idea of lands held in trust, therefore, was not a new concept to the
General Assembly when, in its early attempts to create port towns,
it placed the responsibility for setting up and managing them in
trustees.79
With this same knowledge of trusts, the General Assembly
drafted the Act for Ports in 1691, thereby establishing the
Yorktown trustees.8 " The General Assembly appointed the first two
trustees of Yorktown, Joseph Ring and Thomas Ballard,"' and in
1699, authorized individual county courts to appoint new trustees
to replace those who died or resigned. 2 At the same time, the
General Assembly took it upon itself to confirm that the trustees
held title to Yorktown's public lands.8 " The General Assembly gave
the town even more autonomy in 1757 when it granted the county
75. CHANTAL STEBBINGS, THE PRIVATE TRUSTEE IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 3 (2002).
76. Id. at 3-4.
77. See DeLong, supra note 59, at 34.
78. See STEBBINGS, supra note 75, at 3.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 38-49.
80. 3 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 56. Although there were earlier attempts to
create a town in York County, this Act was the first successful attempt and thus the true
origin of the trustees.
81. See History of York County, supra note 47, at 257.
82. 3 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 187-88.
83. Id. at 187.
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court and trustee(s)14 the municipal power to repair and maintain
Yorktown's public property, including the commons area and the
streets."5 In 1786, the General Assembly incorporated Yorktown, 8
and Thomas Nelson was elected as the town's first mayor.8 7
Although the town was incorporated, the trustees remained in
control of Yorktown's public lands. Yorktown remained incorpo-
rated for only six years, during which time there were six different
mayoral elections, the last of which was recorded in 1793.88 The fact
that the trustees maintained control of the public lands of Yorktown
is evidenced by the General Assembly's continued recognition of
the trustees over the next century and a half, 9 and by an 1806 act
granting the trustees complete police powers, including the
authority to make laws and levy taxes as required to maintain the
town lands.9" And, while the boundaries of the land owned and
84. Five men were entrusted with these municipal powers-William Nelson, Thomas
Nelson, Dudley Digges, John Norton and Edmond Ambler. 7 id. at 138. In 1757, the justices
of the county court were still responsible for appointing trustees, see 3 id. at 187-88, but the
court records from at and around this time refer to only one of these men-Thomas
Nelson-as a trustee. See York County Records, Judgments and Orders No. 1, 125 (1746-52).
Thomas Nelson was likely the only trustee during this time as he was one of only two
trustees when he was originally appointed as a trustee in 1738. See 5 STATUTES AT LARGE,
supra note 4, at 71. What is perhaps more interesting is that three of the men named in the
1757 Act-Dudley Digges, John Norton, and Thomas Nelson, himself-were justices of the
county court and therefore responsible for appointing trustees. See York County Records,
Judgments and Orders No. 1, 194 (1746-52) (swearing in Norton); id. at 118 (listing Thomas
Nelson as a presiding Justice); York County Records, Judgments and Orders No. 4, 1 (1763-
65) (listing Dudley Digges as a presiding justice). This not only suggests that the court and
trustees were operating in lock-step in governing Yorktown, but it also explains why other
trustees were not needed at the time, with Thomas Nelson's fellow justices appearing to
unofficially fill any voids. This symbiotic relationship continued at least through 1761, when
Digges and Norton were put in charge of the Board of Trustees' public wharf lands. See York
County Records, Judgments and Orders No.3, 249 (1759-63).
85. See 7 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 138.
86. 12 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 376-80 ("An act for incorporating the town
of York"); see HATCH, supra note 51, app. A at 91.
87. HATCH, supra note 51, app. A at 91.
88. See id.
89. The General Assembly named new trustees from time to time, always referencing
earlier acts that addressed the Yorktown trustees and giving no indication that the trustees'
power to control public lands had changed during or after Yorktown's experiment with
incorporation. See 1918 Va. Acts 464 (granting new trustees "all the rights, powers and
duties conferred on trustees" by earlier acts); 1900 Va. Acts 42-43 (same); 1872 Va. Acts 261
(same).
90. The General Assembly essentially granted the Yorktown trustees all of those powers
typically conferred upon incorporated municipalities. See 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF
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managed by the trustees seemingly were in constant flux,9 the
trustees owned and managed all of Yorktown's public lands until
2003. In 2003, the General Assembly finally dissolved the trust,
mandating the transfer of all of the trustees' remaining property
interests to the board of supervisors of the county.92
E. The Claim
James O'Hara claims that, as present owners of the original
eighty-five plots into which seaside Yorktown was divided in 1691,
he and his neighbors are the rightful owners of the waterfront
area that the county recently took painstaking efforts to develop.
Although such a claim, coming from O'Hara and his wife Sarah,
may seem surprising to some, it was not too surprising to the
county officials of York County.93 Opposing plans to expand
Grace Episcopal Church, Yorktown's oldest church,94 and with
his "vociferous complaints" about the county's development of
Yorktown's waterfront area, O'Hara is politely referred to by county
officials as "persistent."95 This persistence, however, may get more
attention than just the County's if O'Hara succeeds in his current
claim of right to an abandoned street behind his Yorktown resi-
dence. Although the Yorktown Board of Trustees sold the road to
Mr. O'Hara and his neighbor for $9,000 in 2003, just before the
trust was dissolved, O'Hara now claims that as his father's heir he
owns one-eighth of the entire strip, and that seven descendants of
his father's business partners own the rest.9" Some documentation
VIRGINIA, FROM OCTOBER 1792, TO DECEMBER SESSION 1806, INCLUSIVE, IN THREEVOLUMES,
BEING A CONTINUATION OF HENING 332 (Samuel Shepherd ed., reprint 1970) (1835).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 57-74.
92. See 2003 Va. Adv. Legis. Serv. 747 (LexisNexis).
93. Even the O'Haras' daughter, Katie, has made news with her protests over York
County's development of the Yorktown Waterfront. See Rusty Carter, On the Waterfront,
Strife over History, VA. GAZETTE, May 18, 2005, at 1A.
94. Constructed around 1697, Yorktown's Grace Church is of particular historical
significance because its walls were not made of brick but rather of marl cut from the cliffs
on the Yorktown bluff. Despite the church being rebuilt several times, some of these walls
remain today. See George Carrington Mason, The Colonial Churches of York County,
Virginia, 19 WM. & MARY C.Q. HIST. MAG. 159, 164-66 (1939) (describing the architecture and
history of Grace Church).
95. Hayden, supra note 1.
96. Payne, supra note 1.
2006] 317
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
conveying at least part of the road to O'Hara's father and his
father's business partners exists, but the parties involved in
O'Hara's case all acknowledge the difficulty in tracing the title of a
parcel with such ancient roots.9" O'Hara's ability to trace title to
Yorktown's waterfront area will certainly be made even more
difficult by the numerous transfers between the trustees and the
federal government.9"
Despite his potential claim to the abandoned road as part of an
inheritance from his father, O'Hara's more recent claim of right to
the waterfront area of Yorktown relies on a trust theory. Protesting
York County's $24 million waterfront redevelopment, O'Hara
claims that he and the other Yorktown residents have a vested
right in the waterfront area because Yorktown lot owners paid into
the land when it was purchased for the town's use as a commons
area in 1738, thereby vesting a right in the present lot owners.99
After this land was purchased, a group known as the Yorktown
trustees owned and managed it, along with Yorktown's streets,
until the General Assembly dissolved the trust in 2003.10 Upon the
trust's dissolution, all of the property held was supposed to be
"transferred to the board of supervisors of the county."'10'
For O'Hara to succeed in establishing a vested interest in the
waterfront area of Yorktown, he must ultimately establish that he
and the other residents of Yorktown are the intended beneficiaries
of the Yorktown Trust, and that when the trust was dissolved in
2003, all of the property held by the trustees reverted to inhabitants
of Yorktown. Under this theory, if the abandoned road O'Hara's
neighbors purchased was never open to the public, then the trustees
would not have actually owned it and could not have sold it as they
did in 2003;102 if true, this strengthens O'Hara's individual claim to
97. Id.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 65-74.
99. Hayden, supra note 1.
100. See 2003 Va. Adv. Legis. Serv. 747 (LexisNexis).
101. Id.
102. In Virginia, if the road was abandoned and never open to the public, rights therein
would have vested in the abutting landowners and passed to any subsequent purchaser of
those abutting lands. See Tidewater Area Charities, Inc. v. Harbour Gate Owners Ass'n, 396
S.E.2d 661, 664-65 (Va. 1990) (discussing fee rights in abandoned streets). By this measure,
the trustees would not have owned the abandoned road if it was never used as a public
thoroughfare, and O'Hara's claim to the road would therefore become stronger.
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the road through private conveyance. Similarly, because the
waterfront area was opened to the public, under O'Hara's theory the
trustees did own it, and the 2003 dissolution therefore effected the
reversion to O'Hara and the other inhabitants of Yorktown. And,
while it is too late for O'Hara to stop the development of the
waterfront area, County Attorney James E. Barnett fears that
O'Hara is using the pending suit for the abandoned road as a litmus
test for his theory and will eventually bring suit on his claim of
right in the commons area should he prevail. 10 3 While the outcome
of any potential suit by O'Hara is uncertain, the potential litigation
that could arise if his theory succeeds would have negative implica-
tions for land trusts nationally.
II. LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE YORKTOWN TRUST
The history, text, and structure of the acts that created the
Yorktown Trust and similar trusts establish that the General
Assembly's intent in drafting these acts was to benefit the Crown
and the counties of Virginia, not the individual inhabitants of the
towns that the acts created. When the United States Supreme
Court interprets the Constitution, generally it analyzes its history,
text, structure, and precedent to determine the drafter's intent.104
The Supreme Court applied a similar form of analysis to determine
whether a trust had been created by a testator in Colton v. Colton,
establishing that a court must "ascertain the intention of the
testator, according to the meaning of the words he has used,
deduced from a consideration of the whole instrument and a
comparison of its various parts in the light of the situation and
circumstances which surrounded the testator when the instrument
103. E-mail from James E. Barnett, County Attorney, York County, Va., to author (Oct.
31, 2005, 09:21 EST) (on file with author).
104. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905-29 (1997) (relying on the history,
text, structure, and precedent of the dual sovereignty system established by the Constitution
while analyzing gun control legislation). Although some scholars may disagree about
methods of constitutional interpretation, there is a widespread consensus that "constitutional
text, history, structure, and precedent are valid sources for constitutional advocacy and
judicial decisionmaking." MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:
ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 1 (2d ed. 2000). For a general discussion of this method of
analysis and its effectiveness, see David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and
Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003).
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was framed."' 5 The Supreme Court has given similar consideration
to contract interpretation, 10 6 and while the Act of the General
Assembly that created the Yorktown Trust does not fit perfectly
into any of these three categories-it is neither a constitutional
provision, a will, nor a contract-it nevertheless falls somewhere in
the ether among them.'0° As such, this Part will examine the
General Assembly's intent in drafting the Act for Ports using a
historical, textual, and structural analysis.'
A. History
When the Act for Ports is analyzed against the historical
backdrop in which the General Assembly drafted it, it becomes clear
that the Assembly's intent was to make the counties in which the
port towns were established the beneficiaries of the trust, not the
individual landowners in those towns. From their very founding to
their independence from England in 1776, the colonies' primary
objective was to generate revenue for the Crown. By creating port
towns, the General Assembly hoped to force traders to execute all
their importing and exporting through designated areas so taxes
105. 127 U.S. 300, 310 (1888) (finding that, despite the testator's use of the term "request"
in a will asking that his wife take care of his mother and sister, the circumstances
surrounding the drafting of the will created a trust for the testator's mother and sister).
106. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the Supreme Court applied a similar
analysis to a trust established as part of an employee benefit plan, relying on circumstances
outside of the written text of the trust contract to find that the fiduciaries of the trust did not
have the discretionary authority to determine issues of eligibility for the plan. 489 U.S. 101,
112 (1989). In making this determination, the Court established that "[tihe terms of trusts
created by written instruments are 'determined by the provisions of the instrument as
interpreted in light of all the circumstances and such other evidence of the intention of the
settlor with respect to the trust as is not inadmissible."' Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt. d (1959)).
107. Indeed, it is not entirely uncommon for courts to treat statutes like these as
contracts. In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court stated that "a statute
is itself treated as a contract when the language and circumstances evince a legislative intent
to create private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the State." 431 U.S. 1, 17
n.14 (1977) (finding the repeal of a state statute to be a violation of the Contract Clause of
the Constitution because it impaired a state contractual obligation).
108. This Part does not apply a precedential analysis because there is no existing state or
federal case law regarding claims to land held in trust for public use. Perhaps the most
relevant case law is that applied in Part III of this Note. Otherwise, this is a case of first
impression, and a court must rely only on the history, text, and structure of the acts used to
establish port towns in identifying the intended beneficiaries of the trusts.
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could be levied on these commercial activities. While the King was
the primary beneficiary of the exercise of taxation, the counties in
which these tax hubs were located were the primary beneficiaries
of the lands themselves.
The history of the Americas is replete with colonization endeav-
ors embarked on almost entirely for the purpose of financial gain.
Even the great explorer Christopher Columbus's voyage discovering
the Americas in 1492 was fueled by a greed for gold rather than a
desire for freedom, discovery, or adventure." 9 While much of
Columbus's exploratory activity was consumed by a search for the
somewhat legendary gold of the Indies, 110 the later ventures of the
early seventeenth century were embarked on with the knowledge
that the Americas were not in fact the Indies and with more
ambition than merely finding gold and spices."' In its colonization
efforts, England hoped to strengthen the entire empire not only by
finding a faster route to the gold and spices of the Indies through
the westward expansion of the colonies, but also by using coloniza-
tion as a source of naval stores such as timber, cordage, canvas and
pitch. 112 With this vision of the economic potential of the Americas,
King James granted charters to various companies of investors,
allowing them to colonize the Americas as financial ventures.
The Virginia Company attracted "investors on [both] patriotic
and financial grounds,""' 3 but it ultimately failed to generate
substantial profits, and the King revoked its charter after an
investigation into the company's operations." 4 But before the King
revoked the Virginia Company's charter in 1624, thereby placing it
109. See HANS KONING, COLUMBUS: HIs ENTERPRISE, EXPLODING THE MYTH (1991)
(averring that a desire to send "mountains of gold" back to Spain was not only the driving
force in Columbus's attempts to discover a faster route to the Indies, but a driving force for
his entire life). Columbus's overwhelming desire to discover gold is evidenced by the last
sentence of only his second journal entry after landfall in the Americas, which read plainly:
"I was attentive and labored to find out if there was any gold." WILLIAM LEAST HEAT-MOON,
COLUMBUS IN THE AMERICAS 37 (2002).
110. See HEAT-MOON, supra note 109, at 42 (describing Columbus's search for gold).
111. JAMESA. WILLIAMSON, A SHORT HISTORYOF BRITISH EXPANSION 156-57 (2d ed. 1931)
(discussing the motives for British exploration of the New World).
112. Id. Although accessing the gold and spices of the Far East ultimately never
materialized in Virginia, orders from England for cargoes of shipbuilding material proved
fruitful and eventually led to a shipbuilding industry in the New England colonies. Id. at 157.
113. Id. at 159.
114. OSGOOD, supra note 21, at 43-44.
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under direct control of the Crown, a commission was sent to
evaluate the economic shortcomings of the colony with the express
instruction to determine whether "unnecessary hindrances to trade
within Virginia existed." '115 The King's concern with the condition
of trade in the British colonies, as well as his ultimate revocation
of the Virginia Company's charter, demonstrate the economic
motives driving England's efforts at colonization. By 1637, the King
recognized the value of tobacco as a trade good in Virginia.1 6 The
strength of the tobacco trade eventually caused the General
Assembly to draft the various acts by which it attempted to create
port towns throughout the colony.
Despite the King's desire for Virginia colonists to diversify their
crops, tobacco eventually revealed itself as the only profitable crop
suitable to Virginia's land conditions." 7 As early as 1621, the King
illustrated his recognition of tobacco as a valuable export, requiring
planters to send all of their tobacco through England to be taxed
before it could be exported elsewhere."' The Acts of Navigation of
1651 further required that all goods from America, as well as Asia
and Africa, be transported to England only in English ships with
English crews-another attempt to capture wealth from the
colonies' products." 9 These restrictions were put in place because
the King believed that unregulated trade with other countries was
either decreasing revenue generated for England or was discourag-
ing colonists from building English vessels. 2 0 Although it is unclear
exactly which of these two reasons motivated the King, there is
little doubt that one of the underlying reasons for the prohibition
was to financially injure the Dutch, with whom Virginia had been
trading freely. The King was apparently successful in his supercil-
ious efforts, because the Act precipitated a war between England
and Holland.' 2 ' This war may have provided a sufficient diversion
for the King, as the colonists seemingly ignored the Act without
115. Id. at 43.
116. As late as 1637, the King expressed his desire that the colony export a better crop
than tobacco. Id. at 28.
117. 1 BRUCE, supra note 52, at 321.
118. Id. at 347-48.
119. Id. at 348-49.
120. Id. at 348.
121. Id. at 349.
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repercussion. 122 An act of the General Assembly effectively repealed
the prohibition in 1660, asserting that "the restriction of trade hath
appeared to be the greatest impediment to the advance of the
estimation and value of our present only commodity tobacco."'23
Between the time of adoption and repeal of this trade restriction,
the General Assembly drafted the first act for creating port towns.
In 1655, the year the first legislation mandating the establish-
ment of port towns in Virginia appeared,124 a petition to the British
head of Parliament, Oliver Cromwell, recognized that, despite the
restrictions on trade, tobacco growth in the petitioner's county was
the greatest it had ever been.'25 This was surely the situation in
most counties, 12 because although the General Assembly's Act of
1655 appears to have ignored the trade restriction, the language of
the Act clearly illustrates the Assembly's concern with the over
trading of tobacco that caused its price to drop drastically. Looking
at this Act through a lens colored by the tumultuous economic
times in which the General Assembly drafted it, the desire to create
a mechanism to control trade and ensure the colony's main source
of income is evident. The Assembly made five more attempts to
mandate the creation of port towns from 1662 to 1705, each of
which also reflected the Assembly's continuing desire to obtain
control of the tobacco trade within the colony and to obtain the
financial benefits that would come with that control.1 27 While
122. William Hill, Colonial Tariffs, 7 Q. J. ECON. 78, 90 (1892) (citing 2 STATUTES AT
LARGE, supra note 4, at 450).
123. 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 540.
124. See id. at 412-14 ("An Act for regulateing of Trade and establishing Ports and Places
for Markets").
125. 1 BRUCE, supra note 52, at 364.
126. Throughout 1654 and 1655, merchants and planters petitioned British Parliament
to stop growing tobacco in England because of the potentially damning effects on the already
over-grown plantations of Virginia. See CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, COLONIAL SERIES: 1574-
1660, 417, 422-24 (W. Noel Sansbury ed., Kraus Reprint Ltd. 1964) (1860).
127. See 2 STATUTESAT LARGE, supra note 4, at 172-76 ("An act for building a towne"); id.
at 471-78 ("An act for cohabitation and encouragement of trade and manufacture"); 3 id. at
53-69 ("An act for Ports"); and id. at 404-19 ("An act for establishing ports and towns"). One
of these five additional attempts to establish port towns occurred in 1685 but was not
recorded in Hening's Statutes because it appears that the proposed act never became law,
likely due to an ongoing disagreement over how to designate tax collection officers and how
to compensate them. For this reason, the King never signed the Assembly's proposed bill into
law. See 1 LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS OF THE COUNCIL OF VIRGINIA 77-78, 95-106 (H.R.
McIlwaine ed., 1918) (cataloging the debate over the bill).
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regulating trade helped drive up the price of tobacco and create
market stability for the colonists planting the crop, 28 the revenues
the colonists generated from the crop paled in comparison to those
that England enjoyed.'29 The clear disparity between the Crown's
profits and the colony's profits cannot be ignored as one of the
Assembly's motivating factors in drafting these acts, especially
considering that the King was in charge of appointing a large
number of the Assembly's members and ultimately had to approve
each of the Assembly's acts.1 ° The King's financial interests and
control over the Assembly provide explicit examples of his authority
and the structure he used within the colonies to generate more
wealth and power for the Crown, but there is also intrinsic evidence
of the King's financially driven design.
In the 1700s, there was a quit-rent, or head-right, system in place
in the American colonies, under which colonists had to pay an
annual fee of one shilling to the King for every fifty acres they
occupied.'31 The quit-rent system arose out of the feudal system of
England, which provided that inhabitants of land had to pay a fixed
amount to the lord of the manor on which that land was located in
lieu of paying them with food or labor.'32 Besides causing colonists
to inhabit only arable lands that could be used to generate funds
to put toward this quit rent, 33 this system also established the
"feudal" manner in which the colonists were viewed and treated as
indentured to the Crown. This feudal mentality must be considered
when analyzing the intent of the Act for Ports and other acts of the
Assembly that mandated the creation of port towns.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
129. At its peak, the revenue generated by tobacco sales in Virginia was around £5000,
while England generated between £200,000 and £300,000 in revenue from tobacco each year.
See Hill, supra note 122, at 91.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
131. See Miller v. Commonwealth, 166 S.E. 557, 559-61 (Va. 1934) (asserting that early
Virginia settlers would not lay off their tracts of land on marsh areas, because such areas
were not arable and could not be used to generate revenue with which to meet the quit-rent
requirement).
132. BEVERLEY W. BOND, JR., THE QUIT-RENT SYSTEM IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 25
(1919) (describing the origins of the quit-rent system).
133. See supra note 55.
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From. the founding of the colonies 13 4 to the various acts of the
General Assembly to encourage trade,'35 it is clear that the intent
of the Act for Ports was to generate revenue for the Crown. The
mere use of trust language in some of these acts does not negate the
underlying message that the Crown was meant to benefit from the
creation of these towns. The General Assembly meant to create
focal points through which to force all trade, whereby it could
exercise political and economic control over both trade and the
individual colonists. The economic circumstances surrounding the
acts which mandated the creation of port towns point toward only
the selfish motives of the Crown, not the selfless motives that one
would expect to accompany a private land trust. Considering that
tobacco, or any other crop for that matter, could not be grown
within the half-acre plots in the towns these acts created, the
General Assembly appears to have been least concerned with
benefitting the actual inhabitants of the towns. Rather, the
inhabitants were put into the position of stewards for the Crown,
carrying out the regulation of trade in these areas. At most, the
General Assembly hoped to help the plantation owners in counties
surrounding the respective towns, which is further evidenced by the
text of the acts.
B. Text
An analysis of the actual language employed by the General
Assembly in the Act for Ports indicates that the Assembly did not
intend to create a trust of which the people of the towns newly
formed were the intended beneficiaries. The language of the acts
themselves indicates a financial motive of the Assembly in drafting
them rather than a motive to create towns for the sake of their
inhabitants. While the text appears to create a trust for the good of
the towns, the reversionary text used by the Assembly creates a
right of reverter in the counties, which is contrary to the idea that
the individual inhabitants of the towns were the intended beneficia-
ries of the trust.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 109-16.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 117-27.
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The opening sentences of all of the General Assembly's acts for
creating port towns evince the atmosphere of economic turmoil and
duty to the Crown in which these acts were drafted.'36 The Act of
1655 opens by establishing its purpose "[to] prevent the great
inconveniencies of trade and comerce in this collony, the long
demorage of shipps with the greate abuse of fforestallers whereby
the poor inhabitants of this collony are greatly impoverished."'37
This phrase reveals the Assembly's concern with the effect
"forestallers," who traded without paying taxes, were having on the
colony's income. 138 In its 1662 attempt at creating port towns, the
Assembly noted that, in addition to the King's express mandate of
the creation of towns, the Assembly's "own conveniencies of profit
and securitie" also provided motivation.3 9 By the 1680 Act, the
Assembly focused its concern more specifically on the effect of the
ungoverned trade of tobacco, asserting that the Act was drafted out
of concern for "the greate extremities his majesties subjects here
must necessarily fall under by the present and continued lownes of
the price of tobacco, the only comodity and manufacture of this
country."'4 ° This is a clear reference to the falling value of tobacco
and the Assembly's hopes to help farmers stabilize its price.
The 1691 Act, however, illustrates that the financial woes of
tobacco farmers were not the General Assembly's only concerns.
The Assembly clearly established the crown's interest in laying its
hands on the tax revenues from the tobacco trade, stating that the
failure to establish port towns had "rendered impossible to be
secured [the customs and revenues from trade goods that were] to
be duly paid into the hand of their majesties respective collectors,
and other officers thereto appointed."' 4 ' The General Assembly
expressed similar concern with its ability to tax trade goods in its
last attempt at mandating the creation of port towns in 1705; it
recognized that port towns would "be particularly usefull and
serviceable to her majesty, in bringing our people to a more regular
136. See infra text accompanying notes 137-42.
137. 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 412.
138. See id. at 412-13.
139. 2 id. at 172.
140. Id. at 471-72.
141. 3 id. at 53.
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settlement and of great advantage to trade.' 42 Here, within the text
of the acts of the Virginia Assembly, is evidence of the atmosphere
in which these acts were drafted and of the true motive behind the
acts: to control the price of tobacco and establish a means to levy
taxes against its trade.
Although the text places the acts in the context of the financial
concerns surrounding their drafting, the acts also have language
that suggests the creation of a trust. All of the language used by the
Assembly to mandate the creation of towns from 1680 to 1705
designated that the lands were to be held by "feofees" for the sole
purpose of establishing towns in the respective counties. 4 ' During
the 1700s, the term "feofee" was defined as a party who receives
property in fee simple, that is, "to him and his heirs forever." '144 The
Acts of 1680 and 1691 designated that the lands were to be held by
"feofees in trust,"'45 while the Act of 1705 completely excludes the
term "trust" from all its provisions.'46 Even though the term "trust"
disappeared from the latter Act of Assembly, the general language,
and therefore intent, of the Act remained the same. The intent of
the acts was to control trade, which in turn was meant to generate
tax revenues for the Crown and stabilize the tobacco trade to
protect the plantation owners in the colony.
The various restrictions the General Assembly placed in the
language of the respective acts mandating the building of towns
further evince the economic motive behind the acts, establishing
that the intended beneficiaries of the trusts were the surrounding
counties and the Crown, not the individual inhabitants of the towns
created by the acts. The 1662 Act required that any party failing to
build a house on his property within two years must pay fifteen
thousand pounds of tobacco to the town for use in further develop-
ing the town.'47 Becoming somewhat more impatient in its 1680 Act,
the General Assembly required that the town land be used "for the
county" and that upon a purchaser's failure to build on his lot
142. Id. at 404.
143. See 2 id. at 418; 3 id. at 56; and id. at 473.
144. JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER: OR BOOKE CONTAINING THE SIGNIFICATION OF
WORDS (Law Book Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (1607); see also BLOUNT, supra note 18.
145. See 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 473; and 3 id. at 56.
146. See 3 id. at 418.
147. 2 id. at 174.
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within three months, the land would "revert to the county."14 The
1691 Act required that the lands be built on within four months or
else the trustees could take the land and sell it to "any other
persons."'49 The 1705 Act was nearly identical to the 1691 Act; the
only change was that it extended the amount of time allowed for
building from four months to twelve months. 5 ° If the Assembly
intended to make the individual inhabitants of the port towns the
beneficiaries of the trusts formed to distribute and manage the land
in. these towns, the Assembly would not have created a right of
reverter in anyone but those inhabitants. Instead, the Assembly
chose to expressly include language creating a right of reverter in
the trustees. The Assembly's immediate desire to use the lots in the
towns for economic purposes is evinced from the language of the
acts, and this fiscally driven desire clearly eclipses any language
that might suggest a trust was created for the benefit of the town's
inhabitants.
The General Assembly not only created a right of reverter in the
trustees or the county if the lots of the port towns were not built on,
it also required the counties in which these towns lay to provide the
funding for the initial tracts of land on which the towns were to be
laid out.' 5 ' In circumstances like these-a case in which one party,
here the county, purchases property but legal title is placed in
another party, here the trustees-the Supreme Court has held that
an implied trust arises; "the grantee in the conveyance will be held
as trustee for the party from whom the consideration proceeds."' 2
The reason for this rule is "the natural presumption... that he who
supplies the purchase money intends the purchase to be for his own
benefit."'53
148. Id. at 473-74.
149. 3 id. at 56. This Act more specifically required that the houses built on the lots be at
least twenty feet square. Id.
150. See id. at 418.
151. See 2 id. at 174; id. at 473; 3 id. at 56; and id. at 417. The 1655 Act was different in
that it demanded that the port areas be laid out "with the consent of the [present]
inhabitants" of those areas, without actually purchasing the subject lands. 1 id. at 412. The
1662 Act did not go so far as to obtain the consent of inhabitants and even imposed fines on
county commissioners who refused to abide by the Act's express instructions. 2 id. at 173-74.
152. Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398, 407 (1898).
153. Id.
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Even though some limited linguistic evidence of the acts suggests
that the inhabitants of the towns may have been the intended
beneficiaries of the trusts, the counties in which they lay provided
the consideration for the lands' initial purchase, which, under the
Supreme Court's rubric, thereby places the trust under the control
of the county. The trust, therefore, was to be managed per the
county's, not the town's, desires. When viewed in conjunction with
the reversion language of the acts, the trustees should have been
acting as the counties desired, with each party retaining a possibil-
ity of reverter if the lands were not so used.
Finally, even the language of the titles of the various acts used to
create port towns evinces the General Assembly's economic motive
in passing them, further evidencing the intent to create hubs for
trade to benefit the Crown rather than to benefit the individual
inhabitants of the towns. In temporal order from 1655 to 1705,154
the titles of the acts were as follows: "An Act for regulateing of
Trade and establishing Ports and Places for Marketts, '' 5 "An act
for cohabitation and encouragement of trade and manufacture, 156
"An act for Ports, &c.," ' 5 and "An act for establishing ports and
towns." '58 While the term "trade" disappears from the titles of the
latter two acts, the term "ports" appears in its stead, which surely
has the same import as the term "trade." Implicit in all these titles
is the General Assembly's interest in generating trade revenues,
which benefit not only the King, but also the plantation owners in
the county lands surrounding the individual towns.
The inhabitants of the counties of Virginia were predominantly
large plantation owners,159 and they were the intended recipients
of any benefit derived from the creation of port towns not taken by
154. Excluded from the list is the 1662 Act, the title of which, "An Act for Building a
Towne," was not actually given to the act by the Assembly, but rather by editors of later
publications of the acts. See 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 172 (noting titles in
margins).
155. lid. at 412.
156. 2 id. at 471.
157. 3 id. at 53.
158. Id. at 404.
159. Unlike the colonies of New England, which were well-suited for towns, "the economic,
climatic, and geographical conditions in the area of Virginia were considerably different" and
resulted in the predominant distribution of landowners in a plantation format. AARON M.
SAKOLSKI, LAND TENURE AND LAND TAXATION IN AMERICA 33 (1957).
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the Crown. The creation of port towns was intended to establish a
central location for plantation owners to bring their crops and to
provide a vehicle through which the trade of the crops could be
controlled, and the price thereby sustained at a fiscally sound
level. 1"0 The Assembly was so concerned with guaranteeing the use
of the lands for this cause that, if the lands were not built on in a
commercial manner, the various town acts required that the lands
revert to the respective county or trustees. 16 1 The text of the acts
clearly points to the conclusion that the only intended beneficiaries
were the Crown and the plantation owners, not the individual
inhabitants of the towns created by the acts. The inhabitants were
merely intended, it seems, as pawns to carry out the duties laid
upon them by the acts to ensure the financial health of the King
and the planters, providing the King with the tax revenues from
fungible goods and creating a stable market for these goods.
C. Structure
The structure of the individual acts that the General Assembly
adopted to create port towns illustrates the Assembly's economic
goals and its ultimate desire to benefit the counties surrounding
the towns, not a desire to benefit the individual inhabitants of
the towns as O'Hara might suggest."2 When viewed within the
structure of the entire textual body of the acts of the Virginia
Assembly, at least those drafted around the time when the
Assembly drafted the acts for creating port towns, it is evident that
the Assembly intended to generate finances for farmers and the
Crown, not to benefit the persons that would eventually inhabit
these towns. The bulk of the text of these acts is dedicated to the
manner of levying taxes while only a minor portion is dedicated to
actually setting up the towns.'63 The manner in which the General
Assembly drafted the acts for creating port towns clearly evinces
their financial concerns and the insignificant, if not nonexistent,
thought given to the formation of actual trusts.
160. See supra Part II.A.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 147-50.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 164-94.
163. See infra text accompanying notes 195-98.
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The first act among those adopted by the General Assembly on
March 31, 1655 provided that persons that relocated to remote
areas to avoid paying taxes should be returned to the county in
which the debt was owed and jailed until the debt was paid.'
In order of their appearance in the statute book, the succeeding
acts provided that, among other things, Indian children could be
taken as servants,' no tobacco exports were subject to custom
payments, 66 all coinage would be valued at five shillings, 6 7 courts
had the authority to license tavern keepers and ferries,6 8 Irish
servants that were not indentured would be released from
service at a set time,'69 and sheriffs would conduct the elections of
burgesses. 70 The act for creating port towns immediately followed
these clearly commercial acts,17 ' either dealing with taxes or
servitude. 17 Although O'Hara would suggest that it is technically
possible, it can hardly be imagined that, sitting among these other
acts, the General Assembly would have placed an act with such a
philanthropic purpose as creating a public land trust, especially
since the term "trust" is mentioned nowhere therein.
164. See 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 409.
165. The Act requires the court's permission to do so, but its clear import is to permit
colonists to take Indian children as servants, a source of free labor and increased productivity
for those permitted. See id. at 410. In fact, "although hedged about with provisions for their
religious instruction and the safeguarding of their rights," acts such as this were meant to
degrade the social status of Indians by putting them on par with indentured servants.
Theodore Stern, Chickahominy: The Changing Culture of a Virginia Indian Community, 96
PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y No. 2, 157, 188 (1952).
166. See 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 410.
167. The purpose of this act appears to be to encourage trade by stabilizing the value of
coinage. See id. at 410-11.
168. See id. at 411.
169. Unindentured Irish servants younger than sixteen were to be released from service
at the age of twenty-four, and those older than that were to serve only six more years. See
id. Even this freeing of servants had an economic overtone; servants were being replaced by
slaves during this time as the colonists realized the economic "benefits" of slavery. See JACK
P. GREENE, PURSUITS OF HAPPINESS: THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY MODERN BRITISH
COLONIES AND THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 83 (1988) (discussing why servitude
was abandoned for slavery).
170. See 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 411-12.
171. See supra notes 167-73.
172. While the act regulating the election of burgesses is not on its face one of economic
concern, it is riddled with threats of penalties for disobeying its mandates, which suggests
that its purpose is at least somewhat focused on generating revenue.
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In 1662, the General Assembly's acts were replete with economi-
cally centered legislation. In fact, the act for creating port towns
drafted that year is the first in a long list of acts centered around
commerce. Six of the seven acts following the Port Act deal with
taxes, duties, or levies, on everything from killing wolves to
encouraging colonists to build ships. 7 3 One cannot ignore the
financial connection the 1662 Act has with the acts drafted
immediately after it, especially when the act for port towns
concludes with the statement that the purpose of the towns was for
"the advancement of the [tobacco] markett."'74 This concluding
sentence is the perfect lead-in to the remaining economic legislation
enacted by the General Assembly in that session, linking them in
both motive and language.
On June 18, 1680, the Assembly again decided to draft an act to
mandate the creation of port towns. Of the sixteen other acts
drafted on this day, at least half of them dealt directly with the
colony's economy. 7 ' From clearing logs to enabling trade ships to
pass safely'76 to setting the value of the export duty of tobacco,
7 7
the concerns of the General Assembly during the drafting of these
acts are clear-to create an avenue for trade and to exert both fiscal
and political control over the avenues of trade. The other acts
drafted on this day seem primarily concerned with maintaining
social order within the colony, providing for the maintenance of
forts, 178 prohibiting slaves from carrying weapons, "' and even
173. See 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 176-79.
174. Id. at 176.
175. Although Act II dealt with the naturalization of colonists as a means to encourage
more settlers to come to the colonies and could be viewed as an economic motive, it was not
counted among the acts dealing with the colony's economy. The following acts, however, were
counted as focusing on the colony's economy: Act III, which dealt specifically with levying
taxes on trade; Act VI, which set the rate for attorney's fees; Act VII, which set the age at
which slaves became taxable; Act VIII, which permitted free trade with Indians; Act IX,
which set the taxable rate on casks of tobacco; Act XII, which created a penalty for exporting
untanned dear hides; Act XV, which provided for the clearing of debris from the rivers to
allow trade ships better access; and Act XVI, which set the fee rates to be charged for
services of the county courts. See 2 id. at 466-87.
176. Id. at 484-85 (containing Act XV).
177. Id. at 466-69 (containing Act III).
178. Id. at 469-71 (containing Act IV).
179. Id. at 481-82 (containing Act X).
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prohibiting outbursts during church services. 8 ° But while the
Assembly showed concern for social order by these acts, the
language adopted by the Assembly in the act for creating port towns
most closely comports with those acts dealing with trade and taxes.
The abundance of acts expressly aimed at generating and control-
ling trade suggests that the act for creating port towns fits within
the economic motives behind the acts as a whole. The only benefi-
ciaries the Assembly could have had in mind in drafting the act for
port towns were the surrounding counties and the Crown.' 8 '
By April 16, 1692, the General Assembly's focus had not changed
significantly, as it demonstrated by drafting a majority of its acts
that year with a focus on commerce. From protecting crops from
wolves8 2 to amending the 1686 tax placed on tobacco,' 3 the concern
of the acts of this session as a whole demonstrate the Assembly's
overwhelming concern for the financial well-being of the colony. In
fact, even the acts seemingly concerned with social order are mired
by an overriding focus on finances, such as the act empowering
sheriffs to collect "publique dues""s and the act for appointing a
treasurer to keep an account of "every sum and sums of money
raised or to be raised by force."'85 The Act for Ports itself falls
between an act amending the tobacco tax and an act providing for
free trade with Indians."6 Based on its position in the acts drafted
in April of 1691 and the substance of the entire body of the acts, the
Act for Ports was clearly meant to create a center for trade to
benefit the entire colony, not to create a small self-sustaining town
to be managed by trustees for the benefit of the town's inhabitants.
The trustees were merely an instrument, like the sheriff and
treasurer, through which the Assembly controlled trade and
collected revenues for the Crown.
180. Id. at 483-84 (containing Act XIII).
181. Although the Crown would also indirectly benefit from any well-being created by the
acts for port towns, one can hardly imagine the Assembly had enough foresight to envision
the eventual dissolution of the trusts hundreds of years later and any benefits the Crown
would receive indirectly thereby. Just as the General Assembly dissolved the trust in 2003,
it could have done so at any time prior had the Assembly so desired.
182. 3 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 42-43 (1691).
183. 2 id. at 51-53.
184. Id. at 47-50.
185. Id. at 92-94.
186. 3 id. at 51-69,
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The General Assembly's responsibilities had expanded consider-
ably by 1705. That year, the Assembly drafted fifty-eight acts, 18 7 as
compared to the mere eight acts it drafted in its 1654-55 session.
1 88
The acts of 1705 contained many of the same acts as the 1691
session of the Assembly,189 but included even more acts concerned
with the financial development of the colony, such as prohibiting
the importation of tobacco from outside of Virginia, 9 ° setting a
standard size and quality for barrels of certain trade goods,' and
placing controls on houses that weighed trade goods.1 92 While all
these acts further evince the economic nature of the General
Assembly's concern in all of its actions, what is most significant in
this set of acts, perhaps, is an act confirming the title of town lands
in the counties that purchased them. The act expressly stated:
[W]here any county or counties have purchased, laid out, and
paid for any lands, for ports or towns, pursuant to the said act,
for ports, &c. or to any other act of assembly, and have vested
the same in feoffees or trustees, according to the said act or acts;
such feoffees or trustees so invested, are hereby declared to have
a good, absolute, and indefeasible estate in fee, in such lands
respectively, which have not been disposed of by the former
trustees .......
By drafting, in the same body of acts that mandated the purchase
of land by a county for the creation of port towns, an act that vested
all lands purchased by counties in those same counties, the General
Assembly established its clear intent that the lands not vest in the
individual inhabitants of the towns. In fact, this act even had a
187. See id. at 227-481. The General Assembly's role was seen as expansive and important
enough at this time that the acts themselves mandated the creation of a town around the
capitol in Williamsburg, not only to help support "his majesty's roial college of William &
Mary," but also because "the general assemblies ... cannot possibly be held and kept at the
said capitol, unless a good town be built and settled adjacent to the said capitol." Id. at 422.
188. See 1 id. at 409-14.
189. Like the 1691 acts, the 1705 acts provided for a tax on liquors, sheriffs' collection of
duties, the appointment of a treasurer, promotion of the killing of wolves, etc. Compare 3 id.
at 42-97 (including the 1691 acts), with id. at 250-481 (including the 1705 acts).
190. Id. at 253-54.
191. Id. at 254-58.
192. Id. at 395-401.
193. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
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retroactive effect on all of the "other act[s] of assembly" that created
port towns. 94 The Assembly seems to have been clarifying, for all
of its history, that it never intended the land of the port towns it
created by mandate to vest in the inhabitants of those towns, but
rather that it always meant for those lands to vest in the counties
in which those towns were created. This final attempt at mandating
the creation of port towns in 1705 is also the final nail in the
proverbial coffin in which this Note argues O'Hara's theory, and
those like it, should lie.
Not only do the acts drafted the same years as the port acts
illustrate the Assembly's intent to use the ports to generate revenue
to benefit the Crown and the surrounding counties, but so does the
text within the very acts for creating port towns.'95 All the acts
creating port towns begin with an explanation of the purpose of the
towns, which was to create a central area in each county through
which all trade was meant to travel. 196 The text concerning the
formation of trusts, if such language was even present in the act,
was subsequent and certainly of lesser importance than that
regarding trade. 9 7 The drafters of the acts not only choose to
address the actual manner in which the towns would be formed
after addressing the manner and means of taxing and controlling
trade, but they also devoted considerably less text to the minutia of
town formation.' This is further structural evidence that the
Assembly's intent in creating the towns was purely economic and
not the more generous intent of forming self-sustaining towns for
the benefit of the towns' inhabitants. Such a philanthropic desire
would certainly have had to exist for the Assembly to have intended
to make the individual inhabitants of the port towns the beneficia-
ries of the trusts formed to maintain and distribute the lands of
those towns.
Looking at the structure of the acts of Assembly in each year the
acts for port towns were drafted, the structure of the individual acts
for port towns themselves, and the structure of the acts of Assembly
194. Id.
195. See Part II.B.
196. See 1 STATUTESAT LARGE, supra note 4, at 412; 2 id. at 172; id. at 471; 3 id. at 53-54;
and id. at 404-19.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 164-94.
198. See id.
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from 1655 to 1705, the pattern of concern for and control over trade
is evident while a concern for creating trusts for the inhabitants of
those towns is absent. The acts became increasingly more focused
on trade and taxation through the years, which left little room for
focus on individual colonists-a focus that was never there to begin
with. When analyzed among the acts of Assembly as a whole, there
is no way around the fact that the Assembly was concerned with
only one goal: bolstering the economy of Virginia through trade. At
no time was the General Assembly concerned with creating land
trusts for the benefit of the individual colonists that had yet to
occupy the towns the Assembly wished to use as tools to strengthen
trade.
III. CONTINUOUS PUBLIC USE DESTROYING RIGHT OF REVERTER
Private trusts can become public trusts when the private trustees
act in a manner that essentially makes them instrumentalities of
the state, or when the lands with which they are entrusted have
been used by the public in such a manner that it would be contrary
to public policy to revert them to some alternate use.'99 Under this
rubric, even if O'Hara is correct that the intent of the Act for Ports
was to vest title to the public land held by the Yorktown Trustees
in the individual inhabitants of Yorktown, the constant public use
of the lands held by the trustees over the past three-hundred-plus
years, in conjunction with the trustees' role as an instrumentality
of the state, would override any right of reverter placed in those
townspeople. There is a strong case against an O'Hara-esque theory
in the history, text, and structure of the acts of the General
Assembly, but even without this evidence against it, O'Hara's claim
would fail because when trustees govern like a municipality and
when lands are openly designated and used for public purposes, as
is the case in Yorktown, those lands cannot later fall subject to a
private claim of right. 00
199. See infra text accompanying notes 201-09.
200. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (holding that "where the tradition of
municipal control [of a park held in trust by the city] had become firmly established,"
substituting private trustees for the city was insufficient to "transfera this park from the
public to the private sector" and that the donee of the land, who conditioned its use as a
"whites only" park, no longer had a possibility of reverter).
336 [Vol. 48:303
HAUNTED BY HISTORY
The Yorktown trustees may indeed have played a municipal role.
Trustees are deemed to have become instrumentalities of the state,
and in a sense quasi-municipalities, when their conduct becomes "so
entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a
governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional
limitations placed upon state action."' 0' 1 In Evans v. Newton, the
United States Supreme Court stated that "when private individuals
or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions
governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities
of the State."20 2 The trustees of Yorktown were just such private
individuals, and their functions were undeniably governmental.
As early as 1757, the General Assembly gave the Yorktown County
Court and trustees the municipal authority to repair, widen and
maintain the public streets of Yorktown.0 3 In the years 1807 to
1925, the Assembly continued to increase the trustees' governmen-
tal powers, 2°4 which ultimately led the Supreme Court of Virginia
to conclude that the trustees were a "quasi-municipal corpora-
tion."2 5 The court made this determination in the 1926 case Shield
v. Peninsula Land Co., relying on the "functions of public authority"
carried out by the Yorktown trustees and asserting that "the
[Virginia Assembly] has kept in force for Yorktown a board of
trustees in whom is vested the title to its public property and upon
whom necessarily fall some of the functions of local government."'O'
The court not only reinforced the fact that title to the public
property of Yorktown was vested in the trustees,20 7 but it also
recognized the governmental character of the trustees. This
governmental character sufficiently pervaded the trustees' conduct
to subject the trustees to the constitutional protections established
in Evans, thereby removing any right of reverter that may have
201. Id. at 299.
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
205. Shield v. Peninsula Land Co., 133 S.E.2d 586, 593 (Va. 1926) (finding that no claim
in equity could be brought against the trustees because it was within their authority as a
quasi-municipality to allow a party to build on the lands owned by the trustees).
206. Id. at 592.
207. Although land is designated as "vested" in a trustee, this is not repugnant to a trust
in which the true beneficiary of the land is someone other than the trustees, so this fact alone
does not defeat O'Hara's theory.
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been attached to the land before its open and constant public use
under the trustees' rule.
Not only will public use of land governed by a quasi-municipal
body destroy a right of reverter, but such a right of reverter in lands
held by an incorporated municipality and utilized for a public
purpose for a long period of time will revert to the state before
reverting to some other nonpublic use.20 8 When a private trust that
held the city of Memphis's public land was dissolved in 1879 after
the city become insolvent, the Supreme Court stated in Meriwether
v. Garrett that "[iut would be a perversion of that trust to apply [the
lands] to [nonpublic] uses. ' The lands of Yorktown, and any other
public trust, must be protected from being applied to nonpublic
uses, just as the Supreme Court recognized in Meriwether. It would
be an even greater "perversion" than the Court found in Meriwether
to turn over the historic lands of the port towns of Virginia to
private individuals, or to even put them at risk of this fate.
The authority that the General Assembly granted to the
Yorktown trustees over the centuries made the trustees a munici-
pality of the state. Municipalities of the state may not be divested
of their property without state action. The General Assembly took
just such action in 2003 when it transferred all the property
interests of the Yorktown trustees to York County.210 It would be a
violation of the Yorktown Trust to allow the lands to revert to the
inhabitants of Yorktown upon the dissolution of the trust, and a
court hearing O'Hara's claim should find that where the land held
by the trustees did not revert to the county, it must revert to the
State. The Yorktown Trustees were in fact a quasi-municipal
corporation clothed in the powers of government, and the lands they
held were continuously and openly used for the public's benefit.
Even if the intention of the General Assembly was to create a
private trust for the individual inhabitants of the port towns they
208. In Meriwether v. Garrett, the Supreme Court passed all the city of Memphis's
property into the State's immediate control when the city became insolvent. 102 U.S. 472,
512-13 (1880). It did so purely because of the lands' open and continuous prior public use
despite the city's status as incorporated and despite a private trust holding the lands. Id.
209. Id. at 513. The Supreme Court here was concerned with the defunct municipal
corporation selling the lands held in public by the trust to pay off its debts, stating that "[the
dissolution of the charter does not divest the trust so as to subject property of this kind to a
liability from which it was previously exempt." Id.
210. 2003 Va. Adv. Legis. Serv. 747 (LexisNexis).
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created, jurisprudence and public policy demand that the lands
remain public, rather than reverting to private individuals.
IV. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES
If courts validate O'Hara's theory that the inhabitants of
Yorktown are the beneficiaries of the trust created to found the
town, they could set a precedent that wherever a land trust was
formed to benefit the inhabitants of the lands surrounding the trust
lands, those inhabitants would have a potential claim to those
lands should the trust ever be dissolved. Trusts such as these were
common during the colonization of America, and they have even
found a modern incarnation-the conservation trust.21' From claims
based on colonial land trusts formed as early as the 1700s to those
that may arise from land conservation trusts, courts will be
swamped with litigation and title offices will be tangled in a web of
ownership confusion if a theory such as O'Hara's is given credence.
The General Assembly created at least twenty towns through a
variety of legislation, all of which relied on the trust system to
divide and sell the town lands and maintain the remaining public
lands.212 In many of the locations where towns were to be started,
lots were likely sold to individuals from trusts that gradually
dissolved as the town failed to ever become economically viable.
Landowners' fates would be uncertain in a town that "was absorbed
into the countryside which surrounded it," like Gloucestertown on
the opposing bank of the York River from Yorktown.213 If O'Hara
succeeds, the heirs to any original lot owners in such failed towns
could potentially claim not only their original lots, but all other
lands within the original fifty-acre tract that remained undeveloped
and "public." Several towns did, however, become economically
viable and eventually became incorporated. This was the case for
211. See infra text accompanying notes 218-20.
212. See 1 STATuTES AT LARGE, supra note 4, at 412-14; 2 id. at 471-78; 3 id. at 53-69; and
id. at 404-19.
213. Karen B. Fisher, Community in Gloucestertown, Virginia: The Context and
Archeology of Town Development in 17th and 18th CenturyVirginia 167 (1986) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, College of William & Mary) (on file with Swem Library, College of William &
Mary).
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Norfolk 1 4 and Hampton,21 which still exist today. Whatever lands
were turned over to the municipality by the trustees when they
were dissolved could be the source of a claim of right by an inhabit-
ant of the city under O'Hara's trust theory. On an even larger scale,
the entire state of Georgia was established in the form of a trust in
1732,216 and although the trustees forfeited their charter to the
King in 1752,217 the success of O'Hara's theory could give rise to
potential ancient claims based on this colonial land trust. By
recognizing the intent of these types of land trusts through an
analysis like that performed in Part II of this Note, courts should
strike down any private claims arising out of these trusts.
Under the same analysis, the intent of modern land trusts, and
therefore their intended beneficiaries, can be determined, and
claims based on a theory similar to O'Hara's can be thwarted. The
land trust movement has gained strength in modern America as a
means to conserve natural resources.2 ' Many of these land trusts
place lands in the ownership of private individuals and designate
the public as the beneficiary of the trusts.21 9 Because these trusts
are so similar to the ones used in colonial Virginia, successfully
proving O'Hara's theory could even result in negative and uninten-
tional repercussions for these conservancy trusts.220 This Note seeks
to prevent these repercussions by offering a form of analysis and
214. Norfolk became the colony's third city to incorporate, in 1736, when the General
Assembly authorized Norfolk to adopt a municipal government, which included a mayor, a
recorder, eight aldermen, and sixteen common councilmen. THOMAS C. PARRAMORE,
NORFOLK: THE FIRST FOUR CENTURIES 72 (1994).
215. Hampton had such economic success that in 1716 it was described as the "place of the
greatest trade in all of Virginia." John C. Rainbolt, The Absence of Towns in Seventeenth-
Century Virginia, in 35 J. S. HIST. 343, 349 (1969) (quoting JACQUES FONTAINE, MEMOIRS OF
A HUGUENOT FAMILY 292-93 (1853)). Hampton was finally incorporated in 1849. CAROL
McGINNIs, VIRGINIA GENEALOGY: SOURCES & RESOURCES 228 (1993).
216. The Georgia charter identifies twenty-four gentlemen, naming them the 'Trustees
for establishing the Colony of Georgia in America" and giving them the authority to divide
and sell all of the land for the purpose of "settling and supporting, and maintaining the said
colony." Charter of the Colony of Georgia, reprinted in 1 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE
STATE OF GEORGIA 12-13 (Allen D. Candler ed., 1970).
217. E. MERTON COULTER, A SHORT HISTORY OF GEORGIA 74 (1933).
218. RICHARD BREWER, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 36-40
(2003).
219. See id. at 19, 24-26, 31.
220. This result would be fatefully ironic since O'Hara claims the only reason he wishes
to prove such a theory is to preserve the historic waterfront area of Yorktown. Hayden, supra
note 1.
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applicable jurisprudence by which to negate any claimed private
right of reverter in such lands.
Due to the rapid development of lands throughout our country,
the conservation of land is of the utmost importance. To give
credence to a theory such as O'Hara's might have a deterrent
effect on those who would otherwise create such trusts. Both the
government and private individuals should be encouraged in, not
deterred from, creating conservation trusts. O'Hara's theory would
prevent a government from taxing inhabitants of an area for the
purchase and preservation of lands that would ultimately benefit
those inhabitants as well as the nation, because such a theory
would create the risk that, at some time in the future, a claim of
reverter could be made to the lands purchased with the subject tax
revenues. Further, the theory would allow the heirs of private
individuals to stake a private claim to lands that had been in
continuous public use per the trust settlor's wishes by merely
dissolving the trust and claiming a right of reverter as the heir to
the party who financed the purchase of the trust lands. This is
essentially O'Hara's theory, and it must fail.
CONCLUSION
The trust formed to establish Yorktown is not only identical to
trusts used to form many other towns and cities in coastal Virginia,
but also similar to those used in modern days to create conservation
trusts. Validating O'Hara's theory of resident beneficiaries could
lead to a plethora of unwarranted litigation over lands that were
clearly not intended to vest in the citizens living around them. This
was not the General Assembly's intent, and, as a matter of both
interpretation and public policy, cannot be recognized as its intent.
An analysis of history, structure, and text of the acts that formed
these colonial land trusts reveals the General Assembly's intent to
vest the trust property in the surrounding counties upon dissolution
of the trusts. As recognized by the Supreme Court in Firestone Tire
2006]
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& Rubber Co. v. Bruch221 and Colton v. Colton,222 courts should
resolve doubts as to trusts with regard not only to the words by
which they were formed, but with respect to the circumstances and
situations surrounding their formation. The colonial trusts at issue
here were drafted at a time when the tobacco trade needed to be
reined in and protected because the colonies were not generating
the wealth the investors in these "ventures" had expected.223 The
text of the subject acts is riddled with language concerned only with
commerce, 224 and the acts themselves are drafted among other acts
which are similarly focused on generating revenue and maintaining
control of trade.225 Under these circumstances, a court could not
reasonably infer that the intent of the General Assembly was
anything other than to bolster the financial health of the entire
colony-rather than to increase the property value of the individu-
als living in the port towns they created. These towns were -merely
places to police and encourage trade, to sustain the overproducing
tobacco plantations surrounding them, and ultimately to generate
revenue for England. It is arduous to imagine that the trustees
designated to manage the public lands of these towns were meant
to do so in any manner other than that which would generate the
most revenue for the entire colony. But a theory such as O'Hara's
can only survive if one establishes that the trustees were meant to
hold the public lands of these towns in trust, preserving their value,
until some future time at which they would revert to the town's
inhabitants. Surely, the General Assembly could not have had such
foresight or been concerned with such trivial things as creating a
trust for the individual inhabitants of these towns. By all accounts,
the inhabitants of these towns themselves were to be nothing but
stewards of the Crown-levying taxes, regulating trade, and pro-
viding other purely commercial services. If the General Assembly
was concerned with bolstering the landholdings of the towns'
221. 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989) (asserting that doubts as to the identification of a trust's
beneficiaries are to be resolved in light of circumstantial evidence of the trust's settlor's
intentions).
222. 127 U.S. 300, 309 (1888) (interpreting a testator's will to determine the beneficiary
of the trust established thereby based on both the words of the document as well as the
circumstances surrounding the testator's commissioning the will).
223. See supra Part II.A.
224. See supra Part II.B.
225. See supra Part II.C.
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inhabitants, it would not have included a right for the trustees to
take the land from any person who did not put it to such a commer-
cial use.226
Public land trust jurisprudence also dictates that these lands
remain in the control of the municipalities in which they lie so that
they may continue to be used for the public's benefit as the
municipality sees fit. As evidenced by the recent holding in Kelo v.
New London, municipalities are even justified in their conversion
of certain private lands to private uses if the overall benefit is for
the common good.227 When even private uses can trump a private
landowner's rights to property, a private landowner's claim to lands
used by a municipality for public purposes cannot have much force.
But, perhaps the most analogous example of these arguments in
modern property jurisprudence applies to land held by homeowners'
associations. Although land held by homeowners' associations is
typically donated by the developer of a subdivision as opposed to
being purchased by the landowners in the subdivision, the value of
the commonly held land is reflected in the value of lots within the
subdivision. This same argument could be applied to the public
lands purchased and held by the Yorktown Trustees. Virginia has
codified this idea of mutual benefit, providing that
[a]ll real property used for open or common space [in a planned
development] shall be construed as having no value in itself for
assessment purposes. Its only value lies in the value that is
attached to the residential or commercial property which has a
right by easement, covenant, deed or other interest.22 '
Just as modern-day statutes treat common areas in planned
developments as investments in the privately held property in the
development, the purchase of the public lands of Yorktown can be
construed as made with identical intent.
A claim to the public property once held by the Yorktown
trustees, or any trust similarly created, cannot stand. Any such
226. See supra text accompanying notes 147-50.
227. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (allowing a municipality to condemn properties that were not
blighted as part of an overall development plan for the area, despite the potential that the
properties might be sold for private use as part of that plan).
228. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3284.1 (West 2004).
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trust created in the developmental stages of the colonies, as was the
one in Yorktown, should be interpreted as just what they were:
mechanisms for controlling trade and protecting English invest-
ments in the colonies. There was no intent whatsoever to create
private trusts for the inhabitants of port towns, rather only an
intent to create a body to ensure the King's will was carried out in
the manner prescribed by the acts that created the towns.. Even if
such a trust could be found, the continuous public use of the land
essentially changes its nature under modern property jurispru-
dence, and such public use takes priority over the directions of any
trust that once governed the use of the subject lands. As such,
O'Hara's theory should be rejected, and all such public trust lands
should be recognized as vested in the municipalities in which they
lie.
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